Saturday, December 3, 2016

Panentheism & Providence In Elizabeth Johnson's Ask the Beasts

This is the short paper that I recently presented at AAR in San Antonio. It was for a panel in honor of the work of theologian Elizabeth Johnson, which was organized by Scott MacDougall and Tripp Fuller. The other panelists included: Catherine Keller (my doctoral advisor), Lisa Sowle Cahill, Cynthia Rigby, and Eric Daryl Meyer. I believe that there will soon be a podcast of the event made available on Homebrewed Christianity, but until then, I wanted to share my original, slightly longer paper (to which Johnson offered a thoughtful, engaging response that considered the distinct traditions of process theology and Thomism):

I am very grateful for the opportunity to participate on this panel in honor of Elizabeth Johnson’s inspiring career. Like many other students who have pursued theological education in recent decades, my first encounter with Johnson’s work was She Who Is. Reading it in one of my first theology courses was a transformative experience, as I was moved by her call to embrace female symbols of God in dialogue with the orthodox tradition. As Johnson put it, her strategy in She Who Is was to connect “feminist and classical wisdom” (8). Thus, she affirmed Ruether’s “critical principle of feminist theology…[that] whatever diminishes or denies the full humanity of women must be presumed not to reflect the divine” (30), and then unfolded a relational vision of God through biblical and Thomistic sources. By creatively entangling past to present, tradition to experience, Elizabeth Johnson has become a crucial theological guide for many today.

Already in She Who Is, Johnson was relating ecology to faith. But her theology of creation achieved perhaps its fullest expression with her recent Ask the Beasts. In this brilliant work of constructive theology, Johnson continues her strategy of demonstrating how classical sources are relevant to the present, but now in relation to science. Beginning with a close reading of Darwin’s On the Origin of Species, she then reflects on its implications for Christian faith. With wisdom and insight, she considers many key issues within the religion-science dialogue, including: the relationship of humans to nonhumans; the realities of chance and purpose in nature; God’s presence and action in creation; the problem of suffering throughout evolution; and the environmental crisis. In the process of confronting such issues, Johnson once again uncovers surprisingly traditional resources for persons of faith through her meditations on scripture and theological texts. With its beautifully clear prose and carefully formulated arguments, Ask the Beasts is destined to become yet another classic.

Many of the concerns that Johnson considers throughout Ask the Beasts have also been important to my own research. But while Johnson draws “largely from the Catholic intellectual tradition” (xviii) – an admirable tradition, especially in her appropriation of it – it is not as much my own, despite my love for some apophatic thinkers. With a background more in Protestantism and process thought, I often find my differences with Thomists to be both challenging and fruitful to consider. As such, I want to ask a few closely related questions about Johnson’s proposals in Ask the Beasts, relating to her Thomistic arguments for panentheism as an ecological model of the God-world relationship: first, about the meaning of “panentheism”; second, about how Johnson might revise Aquinas’ theism; and lastly, about her noncoercive account of divine providence.

In chapter five, “The Dwelling Place of God”, Johnson considers the classical doctrine of omnipresence in order to emphasize divine immanence within creation. Against the Western dualism of spirit over matter that denied “the natural world’s intrinsic worth” (126), she shows how traditional sources, from scripture to the creeds, have emphasized God’s intimate presence in creation. Thus, the Creator is not dualistically separate, but immanently dwells in all things, “blessing” all with intrinsic worth (124). Philosophically, Johnson looks to Aquinas’ view of God as “being itself”, in which creation participates as in its gracious source. Thus, God and creation are connected, so “nature can never be thought to be godless,” she writes (144). According to Johnson, when Aquinas images God as “in all things” and “all things in God,” this entails an “interesting mutuality” between God and creation – which she suggests can be called “panentheism” (147).

Aquinas, the panentheist? Is he not, as many believed, the “premier representative of classical theism”? If panentheism simply indicates God’s all-encompassing presence in all things, which classical theists affirm, is it still a useful theological category? Although panentheism appeared in the works of 18th century German idealists, the process philosopher Charles Hartshorne popularized it in the 20th century as a way between Thomistic theism and Spinozan pantheism. For him, it not only holds together immanence and transcendence, but also means that God and the world mutually influence one another. On his reading, Thomistic theism does not permit God to be affected by the world because God, as “pure act” – the perfectly actualized One – lacks possibility for change, novelty, or movement.

Johnson affirms Aquinas’ God as “pure act of being,” rendered as the “infinite divine aliveness” (144). But she also views God as interactively related to the “open-ended” creation (180), even asserting that “God suffers” (203) with creatures. Does this not imply that there is potential for relational receptivity in God – that it is possible for God to be acted upon? Aquinas seems to deny this in the Summa when he wrote, “God is pure act without potentiality whatsoever” (1.3). Thus Niels Gregersen reflects a common view that since Aquinas’ theism of “pure act leaves no [possibilities] unrealized in divine experience,” God “cannot…be affected by…creatures.”

Without “domesticating” the mystery of infinity, what revisions (if any) are therefore necessary within Aquinas’ thinking in order to affirm the relational panentheism that Johnson suggests? Are there resources within the Thomistic tradition to do so, or might other traditions prove more helpful? Of course, Hartshorne and process theologians present certain possibilities, and Johnson has confessed to finding aspects of that tradition useful. But in keeping with her strategy of reclaiming classical sources, I wonder if an Aquinas-inspired panentheism could benefit from a Cusan supplement. She does not engage this 15th century Catholic cardinal, who wrote two centuries after Aquinas, but I want to briefly suggest that Nicholas of Cusa’s apophatic relationalism resonates with her panentheism.

Like Aquinas, Cusa employed panentheistic imagery of God in all things, and all things in God. But with his non-dualistic doctrine of “the coincidence of opposites” – following for him from the logic of divine infinity and simplicity – Cusa was led toward a more radically relational ontology. Realizing that this doctrine paradoxically implies the coincidence of activity and receptivity in God, he argued that God must be “moved with all that moves.” And since active creating must coincide with being receptively created – or the potential-to-be-created – God is both the “creating” and “creatable” creator.” Thus, while Cusa long agreed with Aquinas that no unrealized possibilities are in God, in his final work he claimed that God is best named “possibility itself”: the empowering source of potential for every actuality. Cusa thereby diverged from Aquinas by viewing divine possibility as prior to actuality, enabling him to affirm real and reciprocal relations between God and creatures – much like Johnson suggests.

The coincidence of opposites even leads Cusa to argue for a non-coercive account of divine providence, a position that Johnson also develops in Ask the Beasts. Since God’s loving mercy and creative power coincide in the divine infinity, Cusa argues that God does not force free creatures, but lovingly “urges” and “calls” them. Drawing on Thomistic sources, Johnson similarly claims that a “risk-taking God” of love “invites but never coerces” free creatures (158, my emphasis). This is crucial to her project of confronting the problem of suffering in evolution. As she writes, “98 per cent of all previously existing species have gone extinct,” so suffering and “death [are] intrinsic to the process of evolution” (184). But such tragedies are the “result of the world’s autonomous operation”, not “the direct divine will”, she writes (191). For her, God never directly intervenes in creation because God is voluntarily “self-limiting” (202).

(With Elizabeth Johnson, right before our panel)
Here, Johnson again diverges from Aquinas, who maintained that God sometimes overrides natural causes for certain miracles. But since Johnson also affirms miracles like Jesus’ bodily resurrection and the new creation (208-9), how would these be brought about if God “never coerces”? Are these not exceptional instances requiring God to un-self-limit? After all, a voluntarily self-limited God could intervene, since no metaphysical necessity prevents God’s un-self-limitation. Finally, does this position not ultimately call the goodness of God into question, who is apparently capable of preventing certain instances of extreme suffering – like the backup pelican chicks (185-6) – but neglects to do so?

Friday, August 19, 2016

The Radical Pluralism of William James

"Absolute unity still remains undiscovered. 'Ever not quite' must be the rationalistic philosopher's last confession concerning it. To the very last, there are the various 'points of view'...Something is still other, from your point of view, even though you be the greatest of philosophers...There may be in the whole universe no one point of view extant from which this would not be found to be the case. This is pluralism." (James, 1897)   
William James in Brazil, 1865
I recently had the exciting opportunity to read through most of the major works of William James (1842-1910) for one of my doctoral exams. Having studied Whitehead – and process thought more generally – for quite a few years now, I was already very sympathetic with the Jamesian project of “radical empiricism.” After all, Whitehead is clear about how much he was influenced by James, calling him "that adorable genius" and ranking him alongside Plato, Aristotle, and Leibniz as one of the four greatest Western philosophers. Additionally, Deleuze was also influenced by James, explicitly describing his thought as a "radical empiricism," and (echoing Whitehead) called him an "astounding genius" while lecturing in 1987.

But even though I had read a small amount of James' writings for myself in the past, I wasn't able to focus on them as much as I would have liked. Now, after fairly close readings of The Will To Believe (1897), The Varieties of Religious Experience (1902), Pragmatism (1907), A Pluralistic Universe (1909), and Essays in Radical Empiricism (1912) – along with a few chapters from both The Meaning of Truth (1909) and Some Problems in Philosophy (1911) – I am more convinced than ever that, not only is James a complete joy to read, but he still matters for philosophy and theology. And, it turns out that I'm not alone in this: beyond the vibrant community of American pragmatist scholars, theorists like William Connolly, Isabelle Stengers, Brian Massumi, and Bruno Latour are four major contemporary thinkers who are deeply Jamesian in new and creative ways. So, for this post, I want to offer a short overview of the Jamesian philosophical project as a whole (a bit like I recently did for Cusa). This includes three interconnected components: radical empiricism, pragmatism, and pluralism. I'm going to focus on the first two below, but I'll include some points about his pragmatism as well.

Radical Empiricism

At the foundation of James’ philosophical project is what he calls “radical empiricism” – empiricist, because he largely accepts the basic position of empiricists like David Hume and John Locke that one can only gain knowledge of reality through direct human experience, and not merely through rationalist reflections of the mind apart from experience; and radical, largely because he insists on going beyond Humean-Lockean empiricism in claiming that human experience is much richer and deeper than whatever impressions are felt through the five senses alone. Thus, James believes that we directly - though often vaguely - experience relations of many kinds: of the body, of an external world, of memory (or the causality of the past), of the subconscious, the divine, and more.

In the introduction to The Meaning of Truth, James provides a succinct, three-fold explanation of what he means by radical empiricism:

First, it includes a “methodological postulate” that what is real must be experienced somewhere, and whatever is experienced must somewhere be real. This claim overlaps with what James means by "pragmatism," a philosophical method that aims to keep concepts, ideas, beliefs, and theories always tied to their experiential consequences. The pragmatist views beliefs as "rules for action," so every abstract difference must make a concrete difference somewhere. It also implies that there may be multiple complementary beliefs about reality if they "work"- in the broadest sense of "working." Furthermore, pragmatism also views truths as human constructions that are always in process, and not as existing in some timeless eternity for us to discover and represent. Truth - with a capital 'T' - does not exist for James. But unfortunately, pragmatism is often misunderstood to mean "whatever works for you is true." This is not at all what James claims. His pragmatism does indeed look at "fruits not roots," "consequences not a priori principles", and toward the "future rather than backward." It therefore views all beliefs/theories as forever hypothetical, never fully capable of grasping the flux of reality beyond perspectives. But it does not thereby result in relativism or subjectivism for James. Beliefs are "true" if they: 1) successfully provide certain "vital benefits" for living - e.g., as practical "short cuts" that help us better navigate the complexity of experience, by continuing to successfully predict future experiences, by making life more meaningful, by making us feel more at home in the universe, etc; and 2) they do not "clash" with previously accepted beliefs that are already held to provide other vital benefits for experience. While some seemingly useful beliefs that initially clash with already accepted bodies of beliefs may force one to revise the older beliefs, this might not always be possible or desirable. Thus, James rejects the all-powerful designer God (despite some claims for its ability to make life more meaningful) because it clashes with his other pragmatic beliefs about freedom, the reality of chance, the problems of good and evil, and modern science. Yet, one need not thereby accept atheism, James argues, since he believes that the divine is a fact in so many person's experiences (as detailed in the Varieties) and that theistic and pantheistic beliefs do produce beneficial effects for so many. James thus "tones down" both the omni-God of scholastic theism and the totalizing pantheism of idealists in favor of a finite, relationally limited, affective divinity (which may not be singular in number, he speculates). Thus, far from requiring scientific evidence or rationalistic proofs, James argues that individuals have the "right to believe" in the divine, to "risk" faith in the "public" realm, so long as they remain critically engaged and reflective, hypothetical, and "tolerant" of the plurality of both religious and secular ways. This is all I will say about James' pragmatism for now, but it is worth exploring further (see his lectures on Pragmatism).

Second, radical empiricism is also a “statement of fact," that relations (both internal/conjunctive and external/disjunctive) are as directly experienced – and therefore real – as the parts of experience. Relations are immensely complex, varying in degrees of intimacy. Thus, James argues that "nothing real is absolutely simple; everything is plurally related." Furthermore, everything is so deeply entangled with other things that "if you tear out one, its roots bring out more with them." Thus, there is no clear line between a "thing" and its "relations." I'll say more about this issue of the reality of relations in the section below. 

Lastly, radical empiricism therefore includes a “generalized conclusion” that the diverse parts of
experience “hang together” by relations that are both real and immanent to experience, requiring no trans-empirical/transcendental support. That is, for James, the world forms a “concatenated”, “strung-along” or “pluralistic universe.” This is an image of the world that he suggests is more anarchical than authoritarian, more like a "federal republic" than a monarchy, and more like "philosophic protestantism" than hierarchical "papalism." So James strongly emphasizes the creative agency and value of every individual, opposes "bigness" in all its forms, says "Damn, all great Empires!" - but this do not lead him to an atomistic libertarianism and to merely opposing big governments while simultaneously supporting big corporations. In fact, James was an anti-imperialist who was deeply critical of American involvement in foreign countries (e.g., the Philippines), especially because he saw it as an effort to expand exploitative, greedy "big businesses" around the globe that lacked concern for the common good and the rights of workers. Thus James' pluralism balanced an emphasis on the individual with an equally strong emphasis on relations and communities. And this leads to the second key element of James’ project: pluralism.

James was very sympathetic with traditional empiricism – which, as he put it, rightly privileges parts before wholes, while rationalists do the opposite. But James was also writing at a time when absolute idealism was quite influential. He was good friends with the brilliant idealist philosopher Josiah Royce and also wrote several critical essays about Hegel. James ultimately positioned his metaphysical pluralism as a middle ground between rationalistic idealism and traditional empiricism. In other words, he claimed a kind of third-way between Kant and Hegel on the one hand, and Hume and Locke on the other. He argued that both groups were guilty of the same fallacy: "vicious intellectualism," which excludes from the reality of a thing what its definition does not explicitly include (essentially what Whitehead later called the "fallacy of misplaced concreteness"). Thus, James argued that the empiricists and rationalists of his day were vicious intellectualists because both excluded the reality of relations from the parts of experience by abstractly defining them as "individuals" or "substances" that exist apart from relations. This requires further explanation.

James criticizes the empiricists for viewing sense impressions as lacking all relations, and therefore in need of some sort of trans-empirical unifying principle or agency to redeem them from an incoherent, irrational chaos of discrete atoms (which mean virtually nothing in isolation). While empiricists like Hume argued that our experience of causal relations between discrete sense impressions are merely due to "habits" – thus leading him to philosophical skepticism – Kant later tried to provide a more rational solution with his transcendental idealism. For Kant, discrete sense impressions are given a coherent unity through the mind’s a priori categories, or the “transcendental ego of apperception.” In other words, trans-empirical concepts are logically necessary in order to relate the chaos of atomistic sense impressions - if we are to avoid skepticism and view reality as rational. Following Kant, Hegel’s absolute idealism is proposed as a superior way of enabling the relational synthesis of discrete sense impressions through the Absolute mind or spirit – which James playfully suggests is really not much more than the Kantian ego blown up like a big “soap bubble.” Either way, Kantians and Hegelians claimed that a trans-empirical entity, agent, or principle must be logically presupposed to redeem our chaos of experience.

James wasn’t convinced by any of these solutions. He pointed out that we virtually never have experiences that come only discretely, apart from relations. Rather, they come with their own partial connections, their own various types of conjunctive and disjunctive relations that give them a certain amount of coherence. Now, this doesn’t secure any sort of perfect knowledge about experience and reality. Far from it. As James writes, “Our science is a drop; our ignorance, a sea.” But even so, he convincingly argues that relations and things come together in experience – and that’s enough for the philosopher to work with. Furthermore, the very concepts that our mind employs to organize experience (e.g., space, time) are themselves derived from experience, rather than a priori principles.

As such, while the rationalistic idealists hoped to secure the unity of the world (and often, an absolutist conception of the divine) by appealing to transcendentally unifying concepts, James insists that the immanence of concrete experience is all that we need to attend to. And furthermore, when we do stick with the “thickness” of concrete experience, we discover that the universe is ultimately  pluralistic - that is, a perspectival "multiverse" rather than a purely irrational "nulliverse" or purely rational "universe". James thus embraces a “mosaic philosophy” without a transcendental mind or absolute spirit that could provide any sort of final unity to reality, and thereby secure a totally rational coherence. While James' pluralistic universe lacks a totalizing vertical unity, we do still get “some” unities – though often in very different respects that leave us profoundly uncertain and limited. Thus, Jamesian pluralism affirms a non-totalizing, “distributive” world of interrelated “eaches” without an “all-form.” His is a radically relational, perspectival pluralism that asks us to work with what we are given: a world that’s partly rational, partly irrational; partly connected, partly disconnected – or as James Joyce so memorably put it, a "chaosmos." Even a pluralistic sense of the divine is plausible in this pluriverse - not an absolute, unifying deity, to be sure, but an "immanent" divine, James suggests. A divine that is not omnipotent, but is essentially limited, and who perhaps suggestively offers life-giving possibilities to creatures. But again, since we have no final foundations for clear and certain knowledge, James argues that everything - and especially matters of ultimate concern - hangs on the word "maybe." James thus proposed what we might now call a "theology of maybe" more than a century before John Caputo's "theology of perhaps"!

Because radical empiricism says that reality is only known in experience, James concludes that "experience and reality come to the same thing." Thus, metaphysics for him just is the analysis of experience in all of its irreducible richness, endless complexity, and unpredictable novelty. He therefore names "pure experience" as his metaphysical ultimate category. Very much like Whitehead's ultimate of creativity or Deleuze's notion of pure immanence, pure experience is the name for what every "pulse" or "drop" of experience is an actualized instance of. It is not a transcendent substance or entity, but a "collective name" for the multiplicity of "things" that dynamically emerge in experience - which then "dip back" into the "quasi-chaos" of pure experience and dynamically reconstitute it, ad infinitum. James explicitly describes pure experience as a nondual "infinite sea" of virtual potential, prior to dualisms of subject/object, mind/matter, and human/nonhuman. Thus, James views it as implying a "pluralistic panpsychism" that sees mind/subjectivity/agency going all the way down in nature, as implicit "in germ" in even non-conscious, seemingly inert things. Whatever exists is thus a kind of panpsychic pattern of pure experience, and this would includes the gods - if indeed they exist. As such, James' radically pluralistic metaphysics of pure experience is ultimately a process philosophy - and he was very much influenced by Henri Bergson in coming to such conclusions. As he writes in A Pluralistic Universe, "What really exists is not things made but things in the making."

Some helpful secondary sources on James:

-Donald Crosby, The Philosophy of William James: Radical Empiricism and Radical Materialism
-William Connolly, "Pluralism and the Universe" (in Pluralism)
-Ruth Anna Putnam (ed), The Cambridge Companion to William James
-Henri Bergson, "On the Pragmatism of William James" (in The Creative Mind)

Thursday, July 28, 2016

Infinity, Cosmos, & Panentheism in Nicholas of Cusa

Here is a glimpse at the complex cosmological vision of Nicholas of Cusa (1401-1464), which I wrote after a full day of re-reading and outlining his magnum opus, On Learned Ignorance. Much more could be said about what follows, but I trust that readers will see this post for what it is: a mere snapshot rather than a fully adequate analysis of Cusa's thought as a whole. My hope is that it will intrigue some readers to investigate Cusa's work for themselves. 

Perhaps Cusa's most stunningly consequential claim in OLI is the following:
"The world has its center everywhere and its circumference nowhere, for its circumference and center is God, who is everywhere and nowhere." 
This provocative vision of a centerless, edgeless cosmos contradicts the Aristotelian/Thomistic/Neoplatonic hierarchical cosmos, the "Great Chain of Being" that dominated medieval thought, and which served to justify ecclesial hierarchy. Now, after Cusa, all is equally a perspectival center, and not merely the earth. Furthermore, the cosmos no longer has a spatio-temporal limit - contra medieval cosmologies, which imagined the stars to be the cosmic circumference. 

Thus for Cusa, nothing finite has metaphysical priority, for all are equally finite, or equidistant, in relation to the infinite. And since all things are their own perspectival centers - and because absolute equality is attributed only to God, the absolute Maximum and Minimum - all things are irreducibly different from each other: "two or more objects cannot be so similar and equal that they could not still be more similar ad infinitum." But each thing - human or nonhuman - is also an image of the infinite God, who communicates being and form to all "without envy," even as the creature can only receive it in a finite way. Thus, each thing is now seen by Cusa to be perfect in its own distinct way. He even calls every creature a "created god" or "finite infinity."

Cusa thus overturned the heterogeneous cosmos in which diverse elements become increasingly "noble" and "pure" as they ascend the ladder of being, replacing it with a homogenous cosmos of equally perspectival and uniquely valuable singularities. It seems to me that modern and postmodern science, philosophy, and theology have continued to validate (or echo) many of Cusa's related ideas in a number of ways:

First, Cusa's cosmology anticipates Copernicus by more than a century, who placed the sun rather than the earth at the cosmic center (i.e., heliocentrism replaces geocentrism). But Cusa went further, claiming that nothing is at the physical center of the cosmos, because God is omnicentric, and creation (as derived from God) images or imitates God "as much as possible." Thus, it too is (metaphysically) omnicentric - although, from another (physical) perspective, its center is "nowhere," since its center is God. 

Second, if there is no absolute cosmic center, there is no cosmic circumference, so the universe is spatio-temporally limitless, endlessly becoming, or "contractedly infinite." Creation thus reflects God, who is imagined by Cusa to be an infinite circle in which center and circumference coincide. An omnicentric cosmos is also "one" from a certain perspective (as enfolded in God), and "many" from another perspective (as unfolded from God). These insights anticipate contemporary theories of the multiverse and cosmic infinity - but again, Cusa's views are based primarily on theological speculations rather than empirical observations. (I'll also mention that, in some ways, it anticipates William James' lectures on "A Pluralistic Universe"). 

Third, since there is no absolute physical center, and since only God is absolute equality while we as perspectival creatures endlessly differ, there can be no absolute (non-perspectival) standard of measurement/comparison between things. Since human knowledge is based primarily on measurement/comparison of proportions, there are two profound consequences of this - one epistemological and the other cosmological: 

1) All knowledge about the physical universe is always necessarily "conjectural," since nothing can provide a non-perspectival standard of comparison between things, and no two finite things could ever be absolutely equal (again, only God is absolute equality).

2) All things must be in motion, since an immobile center at absolute rest is required to measure things in motion (furthermore, only God is absolute rest).

Consequence 1 anticipates post-Kantian philosophy's emphasis on the radical limits of knowing, which dominates nearly all Western thinking down to the present. Consequence 2 anticipates Einstein's special theory of relativity, which says that all rest and motion are entirely relative to the standpoint of the observer. 

Fourth, a centerless cosmos means that all religious claims are perspectival symbols or metaphors that are relative to creatures. They cannot capture God in Godself. Even the Trinitarian names are creaturely metaphors - which are necessary for communal worship, but more importantly, they must be negated to avoid idolatry. Cusa even goes so far as to say that we project ourselves on to God, so that if a lion were to imagine God, it would imagine God like a lion; just as we imagine God in human terms (e.g., Father, Son). Thus, a high degree of tolerance for different and contingent expressions of faith is necessary, and he recommends a dialogical approach to religious differences in order to maintain peace. As a cardinal of the Church, Cusa did not renounce a Christocentric orthodoxy in saying these things. Yet there is obviously something deeply subversive about his approach that enables a more flexible and humble style of religious belief.

Again, these conclusions are based purely on a speculative theology of "learned ignorance" that rigorously holds to the qualitative difference between the infinite and finite. Everything unfolds from that presupposition. Since human knowledge is based on comparing proportions between things - which is quantitative - the infinite cannot be known. And because the finite logically coincides with the infinite (lest the infinite be limited by something external), Cusa ultimately argues: 
"God, therefore, is the enfolding of all in the sense that all are in God, and God is the unfolding of all in the sense that God is in all."
Thus in God's infinity, all opposites are enfolded, including knowledge and ignorance. This is precisely why Cusa maintains that we can only gain some knowledge about reality by first maintaining that we are totally ignorant, by recognizing the profound limits of knowing - not just about God, but about creation as well. Amazingly, ignorance and knowledge coincide as Cusa unfolds a radically relational and perspectival cosmology.

Lastly, in the above quote, Cusa gives us one of the first significant expressions of panentheism in Western theology. His concept of God culminates with the metaphor of God as posse ipsum, or possibility itself. This marks a sharp break from scholastic theisms that privileged actuality over possibility, since the latter is conceived as a 'lack'. But a God of pure act and pure presence is highly deterministic, while a God who is infinite possibility - who 'possibilizes' - is open-ended and continually arrives out of the future. Thus, Cusa ends his speculative theology by claiming that this is the best metaphor for God: the presupposed 'can-do', the enabling divine potentiality for every actuality. Not unlike process theology that developed in the 20th century, Cusa sees each actual creature as 'contracting' the whole interrelated universe, including possibilities, to freely become what it is. Cusa's final panentheistic vision is therefore of a dynamic God who "may-be" (Kearney), not omnipotent, but "omni-potential"(Keller).

For further reading on Cusa (secondary sources), I recommend the following:
-Cloud of the Impossible, by Catherine Keller (chapter 3)
-The Individual and the Cosmos, by Ernst Cassirer (chapter 1)
-World's Without End, by Mary Jane Rubenstein (chapter 3)
-Introducing Nicholas of Cusa, edited by Belitto/Izbicki/Christianson

Wednesday, June 1, 2016

On Gaia & Process Thought (two new books from French Whiteheadians)

I am excited to eventually read two recently published books by French Whiteheadians - both of which are currently only available in French. Thanks largely to the important work of Isabelle Stengers in Thinking With Whitehead, Whitehead seems to be on the rise in some corners of continental philosophy, particularly among those conversant with speculative realism, the new materialism, object oriented ontology, affect theory, the philosophy of Deleuze, and so on. My own view is that the recent turn to Whitehead has much to do with an increasing recognition that too much Western philosophy has been anthropocentric and ontologically dualistic. Whitehead's speculative cosmology provides a helpful way beyond these problems by extending genuine reality, value, and agency to the nonhuman (I have written about this here). In the descriptions of both books listed below, these revolts against anthropocentrism and ontological dualisms are in full view.

The first book that I want to highlight is Facing Gaia, written by Bruno Latour and based on his Gifford Lectures. It should be available in English next year. You can watch his original Gifford lectures here, although the published book apparently includes significant revisions.

The second book is The Lure of the Possible (my translation), written by Didier Debaise. It is a relatively short book that apparently involves a very clear reading of Whitehead's metaphysics, as well as a unique interpretation of eternal objects (always a tricky aspect of Whitehead, as I've written about before). You can watch a lecture from Debaise on Whitehead here.

While studying for my French exams, I translated the publisher's descriptions of both books. It should go without saying that these are not "official" translations (the original texts are linked below). But perhaps some readers will find my humble translation efforts useful for getting a sense of what these books are about.

Facing Gaia (by Bruno Latour)

"James Lovelock has not had much luck with the Gaia hypothesis. By naming with this old Greek myth the fragile and complex system through which living phenomena modify the Earth, some have believed that he spoke of a unique organism, a giant thermostat, or even a divine Providence. Nothing was further from his intention. Gaia is not the Globe, it is not Mother Earth, and it is not a pagan goddess. But neither is it Nature as we have imagined it since the 17th century: that which serves as counterpart to the human subject, constituting the background of our actions.

Now, because of the unexpected consequences of human history, what we have grouped together under the name of “Nature” is leaving the background and rising into view. The air, oceans, glaciers, climate, soil – all that we have made unstable – interact with us. We have entered geohistory. This is the Anthropocene epoch – with the risk of a war of all against all.

The former Nature is disappearing and giving way to a being that is highly unpredictable. Far from being stable and reassuring, this being seems to be constituted by a series of feedback loops in endless upheaval. Gaia is the name that suits it best.

By exploring the thousand faces of Gaia, we can unfold all that the notion of Nature had confused: an ethics, a politics, a strange conception of the sciences, and above all, an economics and even a theology."

The Lure of the Possible: The Recovery of Whitehead (by Didier Debaise)

"By beginning with a recovery of a few updated propositions from the philosophy of Alfred North Whitehead (1861-1947), this essay intends to highlight the conditions of another way of thinking about nature. It takes a pluralistic approach that integrates the multiplicity of ways of being in nature, which are so many ways of experiencing, of feeling, of making sense, and of giving importance to things.

We have entered a new time of nature. Indeed, what remains of the boundaries that modern thought tried to establish between the living and the inert, between the subjective and the natural order, between appearance and reality, between values and facts, between consciousness and animal life? What relevance could the great dualisms that have presided in the modern invention of nature still have?

New stories and new cosmologies have become necessary so that we can rearticulate what hitherto has been separated. This book attempts to present these directly, in the work of William James and A.N. Whitehead, through a pluralistic approach to nature. What would happen if we were to attribute subjectivity to all beings – humans and nonhumans? Why would we not make aesthetics, in the manner of feeling, the stuff of all existence? And what if the sense of importance and of value was no longer the prerogative of human souls?"

Friday, May 20, 2016

Politics of the Trump Phenomenon: Thinking With William Connolly & David Harvey

For many of us, the spectacle of Donald Trump often seems like a terrible dream: is this for real? And how did we get here? How did we go from a far-from-perfect but somewhat more hopeful age of Obama to the possibility of a Trump presidency, with his quasi-fascist, bigoted, nationalist rhetoric? I suggest that we look to the works of William Connolly and David Harvey to gain some conceptual tools to better understand the rise of Trump. First, Connolly’s critique of the nation – in both traditional and secular forms – is prescient. It helps make some sense of the resentment and fear that Trump has tapped into. Second, Harvey supplements this critique of the nation by explaining the rise of neo-conservativism as a sort of correction to neo-liberal globalization. In short, I argue that at least two major factors need to be seriously grappled with in order to understand Trump's political victories: the tensions between secularist and traditionalist accounts of the nation, and the socially destructive forces of globalization.

In Why I Am Not A Secularist, Connolly offers a postsecular critique of the idea of the nation – even in its more tolerant, secular forms. Traditional accounts of the nation see it as a kind of unifying soul of the state. That is, the nation unifies a people around a cultural center, which typically has included religion, morals, language, race, and/or ethnicity. But with the rise of secularism, such accounts of nationhood have often been “thinned out”, as Connolly puts it. For the most part, secularists have not called into question the structure of the nation, but have tried to bend it in a more tolerant direction. Liberal secularists have accomplished this by constructing “the public sphere” as a new unifying center for the nation. This center is no longer anchored by more divisive organizing principles (e.g., religion, race), but rather by more abstract principles, such as general conceptions of rights and/or authoritative modes of public reason. Thus, the secularist way is to refashion the nation with a more “neutral” public sphere as its center. This scenario requires persons to leave their contestable private faiths and convictions at home when they enter “the public sphere”, which is intended to enable greater diversity (for now, I will not go into Connolly’s alternative of a non-nationalist, de-centered, postsecular pluralism - but by all means, get his book and explore his proposals, which I find very helpful).

According to Connolly, one problem with this strategy is that the secular “thinning out” of the nation’s cultural center ends up looking weak. For those constituencies who strongly identify with older forms of national unity, this abstract version of the nation (based on reason, rights, etc.) seems to produce a lack where a more concrete national center used to be. The thin public sphere – the new unifying center constructed by secularists – then provokes certain constituencies to react negatively against this more tolerant (“weak”) style of nationhood, which now has to try to make room for others who did not fit into older styles of unity: feminists, irreligious persons, LGBTQ persons, immigrants, and so on. They then respond by trying to “renationalize” the center, filling it in with more traditional (and exclusive) sources of nationhood: religious, racial, ethnic, and/or linguistic sources of unity.

It should already be clear how Connolly’s analysis is relevant to today’s political scene. Trump's campaign slogan to “Make America Great Again” certainly taps into those disaffected, disoriented, anxiety-ridden constituencies who find too much secular influence in our time to be a source of national weakness. Such constituencies angrily protest against a liberal culture burdening them with “political correctness”; about the rising number of non-white persons who either do not speak English or have another primary language; about the loss of our nation’s “Christian values”; about the rising numbers of irreligious persons; and even about the decline of white majorities and culture. Thus, many desire to re-nationalize the cultural center towards “stronger” sources of national unity. It should therefore be no surprise that a political leader like Trump would appeal to such constituencies: he talks tough, “tells it like it is”, is proudly politically incorrect, and mocks non-white persons and other marginalized persons.

Economic factors are crucial here, and they are closely related to the cultural issues that Connolly points to. One way that Trump has appealed to certain constituencies is by saying that he is going to bring back jobs that other countries (e.g., China, Mexico, etc.) have allegedly “stolen” from Americans. Now, it is true that many American jobs have been lost due to the forces of globalization, and free trade policies in particular. But whatever policies Trump proposes to deal with such job losses, he consistently couples these incoherent proposals with degrading comments about foreign countries, their citizens, and immigrant workers (e.g., he recently claimed that the Chinese have “raped” our country by stealing American jobs). As such, Trump aims to appeal to disaffected, resentful workers primarily through bigoted rhetoric rather than through coherent policy proposals to deal with the challenging forces of globalization. In the process, he taps into the same cultural anxieties and fears that these constituencies have about secular nationhood. As Connolly writes, “Globalization…foments drives by constituencies injured by global market pressures to reinstate the image of the nation to compensate for those losses. The problem is that these compensations typically involve blaming vulnerable constituencies outside the imagined parameters of nationhood for the loss of jobs and so on, when these very effects are generated by global capital forces” (87).

And this is where Harvey’s analysis of neoliberalism and neo-conservatism in his book, A Brief History of Neoliberalism, can supplement Connolly’s critique of the nation. For Harvey, the neoliberal (“market fundamentalist”) ideology that emerged in the late 1970s and rapidly became the ruling ideology of our time has had a profoundly destructive social impact. It was always in tension with the very idea of the nation because of its push towards a globalized economy that – at least in principal – requires national identities to become more fluid. However, with its reduction of freedom to the negative freedom of the market, which leaves behind a chaos of competing individual interests and desires, as well as its commodification of everything, neoliberalism has tended to erode many traditional social solidarities. This situation has made some societies increasingly difficult to govern, often producing widespread anomie, social incoherence, and even nihilism. As such, despite the fact that nationalism is in tension with the individualistic, globalizing principles of neoliberalism, it has never gone away. As Harvey notes, the idea of the nation has rather remained an important social force – a “social glue” – within increasingly fragmented neoliberal societies.

To deal with this situation, Harvey argues that neo-conservativism emerged as a kind of internal correction to neo-liberalism. While neocons continue to affirm a highly deregulated, privatizing market fundamentalism, they try to contain the individualistic social chaos that it produces by imposing social order in an anti-democratic fashion. The neocon’s goal is to restore social order by appealing to some national “center”, a “higher” purpose, a “transcendent” set of absolute values. This tends to include reaffirmations of traditional morals, conservative religion (as in the case of the “moral majority”, or the Christian right), so-called “family values”, and/or race/ethnicity. Neo-conservatism therefore tends to resonate with fascist, nationalist, and/or authoritarian populist movements (which arguably apply in varying degrees to the Trump phenomenon). It tends to be antagonistic toward LGBTQ persons, feminists, environmentalists, racial minorities, etc. It takes advantage of anxious, resentful, and even paranoid constituencies who feel threatened by external forces by then pushing toward increased social control through surveillance, police, and permanent militarization to deal with a world in interminable conflict (e.g., with China, “radical Islam”, etc.). And as Harvey notes, permanent militarization is of course highly profitable for the military industrial complex. Thus, if one understands neoliberalism as an aggressive effort to restore or construct capitalist class power – and the evidence does point to this being the case – then the neocon’s anti-democratic, renationalization of societies is perfectly consistent with the primary goal of neoliberalism.

Having unfolded these political analyses, it seems clear to me that Trump does not fit neatly into the labels of "neoliberal" or "neocon", even as he resonates with them by similarly appealing to the virtues of market capitalism and to unifying cultural centers through his nationalist rhetoric. But while there are indeed multiple factors that might help to explain Trump's rise, two stand out for me: first, the tension between liberal secularist accounts of the nation and those of conservative and/or non-secularist accounts; and second, the socially destructive forces of neoliberal globalization. These two socio-cultural challenges have produced intense anxieties and tensions within certain constituencies that Trump is dangerously exploiting with his blend of neo-conservativism, quasi-fascism, and populist authoritarianism. But ultimately, it is difficult to know if Trump firmly stands for anything other than himself - not religion, not the market, perhaps not even the restoration of capitalist class power...that is, at least not in the way that many other conservative Republicans would prefer. And really, what's more dangerous: a quasi-fascist egomaniac or a textbook neocon? While the latter works to re-situate conservative religion and absolute morals as unifying centers of the nation - and thus as mechanisms of order and control - the former appropriates very similar language while placing himself into the center. Both are terrifyingly anti-democratic realities that must be resisted.

Friday, February 12, 2016

REVIEW: "Deep Pantheism" by Robert Corrington

This is certainly one of Corrington’s most important works to date. For those who have never read his previous books, Deep Pantheism is an excellent place to start. It is relatively short, clearly written, and his core argument for the theological position of deep pantheism is compelling. What always impresses me about Corrington is how he manages to synthesize so many other thinkers into his religious or ecstatic naturalism. He draws deeply on the American philosophical tradition, especially James, Dewey, Emerson, and Peirce. He also engages the Continental tradition, such as Heidegger, Schelling, Schopenhauer, and Jaspers, along with psychoanalytic theorists like Jung and Rank. In this book, he adds a creative appropriation of the Indian philosopher Sri Aurobindo. As a Unitarian (post-Christian) philosopher, Corrington also remains in critical dialogue with the broad tradition of liberal theology, from Schleiermacher’s romanticism to Tillich’s existentialism and Whiteheadian process theology.

Regarding the latter, Corrington views deep pantheism as a distinct alternative to process panentheism (or any type of theism, for that matter), which typically views God as the source of ideal possibilities and the all-inclusive whole of the world. By contrast, Corrington views god in radically pluralistic, naturalistic, and immanent terms. Negatively, deep pantheism rejects the monotheistic idea of God as personal, supernatural, creator, etc. As a naturalist, Corrington claims that “nature is all that there is”, so god is a product of – rather than the producer of – nature.

For Corrington, nature is internally divided into nature naturing (“nature perennially creating itself out of itself alone”) and nature natured (“nature’s products”, or “natural complexes”). Nothing transcends nature, so transcendence is always in and of nature itself. Thus deep pantheism affirms a fully naturalistic god on the side of nature natured, which is a natural complex like everything else. It does not represent a being that is any more or less real than other complexes. It is not a unifying, omnipotent god – an Order of all orders that intervenes, guides the universe towards a final goal, responds to prayers, etc. Nor is this a “flat” pantheism that simply views all of nature as sacred. As such, while “deep” suggests the unconscious depths of nature naturing, we might also name this pantheism “pluralistic,” for there are a “million Godheads” (Aurobindo) emergent from nature. And what is the ‘function’ of the gods in relation to humans? As Corrington writes, they can be “felt as a moment of intensity that goads the self toward a more inclusive and robust realization of its ongoing link to the infinite, but as encountered from the perspective of its own inescapable finitude” (16).

Although these multiple divinities lack an absolute source of unity – and thus are capable of partly explaining multiple, clashing revelations and such – they also participate in what Corrington calls “the Wisdom”, which is a new concept for his work (81). The Wisdom is an internally complex “repository of natural wisdom available” to the human process (84). It too is an evolving natural complex (although unusually vast and complex), which is an emergent from nature naturing. It is the natural “font” of god-ing energies, and thus manifests itself as the finite/infinite gods to human selves through the mediation of naturalistic spirits. However ambiguously and inconsistently, the Wisdom can sometimes provide a deeper wisdom or “higher counsel” to the human process. Among other things, it can provoke mindfulness, comfort the afflicted, and undermine racism by opening the human process to more inclusive communities of interpretation. Beyond the Wisdom, Corrington suggests the apophatic concept of “the Encompassing” (Jaspers), which is a “traitless nothingness” that encircles nature as a whole. In the end, Corrington integrates these  concepts into a "new Transcendentalism", which is his attempt to forge a path between Schopenhauer's pessimism and the early Emerson's optimism: "Honoring both perspectives, it sees the richness and sublime power of many of the potencies of nature naturing, while also recognizing the demonic depths of nature" (98).

Whether one ultimately agrees with Corrington’s deep pantheism or not, this is a fascinating and adventurous work of contemporary theology that will stir the imagination. It will especially appeal to post-Christians, Unitarian Universalists, and "spiritual but not religious" persons. I also recommended it to anyone who is more broadly interested in philosophical theology and religious naturalism.

Wednesday, February 10, 2016

Best of 2015: Movies, Music, Books

Every year I post top ten lists of the movies, music, and books that I loved during the year. I've always been a list-maker, so this is a post that I look forward to creating every year. For a variety of reasons, compiling my 2015 list has taken longer than usual. While I've had my music and book list ready for some time, it has taken additional time to see a broad enough sampling of the most buzzed about movies of 2015. To be sure, I haven't seen all of them - including a number of Oscar nominated films, which I would likely enjoy. Despite these limitations, I managed to see a lot of great movies last year. My final qualification for this list is about my book selections. A number of the books on my list were not technically first published in 2015, but within the last couple of years (although in some cases, they were published in paperback in 2015). Having said that, these are the movies, music, and books that I loved in 2015:

1) Ex Machina, directed by Alex Garland
2) Love and Mercy, directed by Bill Pohlad
3) Mad Max: Fury Road, directed by George Miller
4) Straight Outta Compton, directed by F. Gary Gray
5) The End of the Tour, directed by James Ponsoldt
6) Sicario, directed by Dennis Villeneuve
7) The Room, directed by Lenny Abrahamson
8) The RevenantAlejandro G. Iñárritu
9) The Danish Girl, directed by Tom Hooper
10) Chi-Raq, directed by Spike Lee

Honorable Mentions: The ExperimenterStar Wars: The Force AwakensBridge of Spies; Spotlight; Tangerine; The Martian; Inside Out; Best of Enemies: Buckley vs. Vidal; The Gift; Wildlike.

1) Sufjan Stevens, Carrie and Lowell
2) Father John Misty, I Love You, Honey
3) Kendrick Lamar, To Pimp a Butterfly
4) Jason Isbell, Something More Than Free
5) Leon Bridges, Coming Home
6) Kacy Musgraves, Pageant Material
7) Ryan Adams, 1984
8) Coldplay, Head Full of Dreams
9) Josh Ritter, Sermon On the Rocks
10) City and Colour, If I Should Go Before You

Honorable Mentions: Death Cab For Cutie, Kintsugi; Caitlin Canty, Reckless Sunshine; The Decemberists, What a Terrible World, What a Beautiful World; The Weeknd, Beauty Behind the Madness; Adele, 25; Bjork, Vulnicura; Mutemath, Vitals; Wilco, Star Wars; Of Monsters and Men, Beneath the Skin.

1) Kantian Reason and Hegelian Spirit: The Idealistic Logic of Modern Theology (paperback edition, 2015) by Gary Dorrien
2) Deleuze and the Naming of God: Post-Secularism and the Future of Immanence (paperback edition, 2015) by Daniel C. Barber
3) Reimagining the Sacred by Richard Kearney and Jans Zimmerman (eds.)
4) Unprecedented: Can Civilization Survive the CO2 Crisis? by David Ray Griffin
5) Thinking With Whitehead (paperback edition, 2014) by Isabelle Stengers
6) Deep Pantheism: Toward a New Transcendentalism by Robert S. Corrington
7) Strange Glory: A Life of Dietrich Bonhoeffer (paperback edition, 2015) by Charles Marsh
8) This Changes Everything: Capitalism vs. the Climate by Naomi Klein
9) The Homebrewed Christianity Guide to Jesus: Lord, Liar, Lunatic, or Awesome? by Tripp Fuller
10) The Uncontrolling Love of God by Thomas Jay Oord
Older books that I also loved in 2015: The Fragility of Things by William Connolly; A World of Becoming by William Connolly; A Black Theology of Liberation by James Cone; Religion and Ecology by Whitney Bauman; Process Theology as Political Theology by John Cobb; Pragmatism by William James; Josiah Royce: Selected Spiritual Writings by Josiah Royce; The New Gospel of Christian Atheism by Thomas Altizer; What is Philosophy? by Gilles Deleuze and Felix Guattari; A Thousand Plateaus by Gilles Deleuze and Felix Guattari; Hegel and Christian Theology by Peter Hodgson; The End of Certainty by Ilya Prigogene.

Thursday, January 14, 2016

On Eternal Objects: Whiteheadian Idealism or Empiricism?

What I want to explore in this post is one of the most controversial concepts in Whitehead’s metaphysics: the “eternal objects” (EOs), which he also calls “pure potentials” or “pure possibilities.” In the end, how one interprets EOs largely determines one’s view of Whitehead’s overall system: whether in terms of idealism or empiricism.

At a basic level, EOs make sense of the conviction that “thought is wider than nature” - or better, that potentiality is wider than actuality. For Whitehead, reality cannot be reduced to the actual, which would imply a static world without genuine novelty or creativity. There would be no unrealized potential in such a cosmos. Some sphere of genuinely real possibility is therefore required to make sense of alternatives, contingencies, the “could-have-been-otherwise.”

This sphere is different from – although continuously interpenetrating – actuality. While actuality is intrinsically agential and determinate, EOs are indeterminate and non-agential (i.e., powerless “quasi-causes”). Borrowing Deleuzian language, Roland Faber therefore likes to say that while the actual exists, EOs insist as transcendental conditions for novelty and creativity. Both are real, but differently. As such, EOs

...answer the question of how the creative passage of…becoming can be a passage that is also creative and still escapes these two pitfalls of mere perpetual perishing into worthlessness, on the one hand, and mere eternal repetition of the Same, on the other. (DM, 139). 

More specifically, EOs account for things like sensory qualities (‘redness’), tactile qualities (‘softness’), conceptual abstractions (shapes and numbers), contrasts, relations, patterns, and emotions that differently condition actualities. Without pre-determining anything, EOs uniquely contribute to an entity’s becoming. Although comparable to universals like Ideas, Platonic forms, and predicates, Whitehead denies that EOs are universal essences in any traditional sense. They are not a priori logical structures for the world's particulars, but dynamic conditions for novelty and creativity.

As a radical empiricist, Whitehead argues that concrete actualities are “the only reasons.” As such, one cannot talk about eternal objects as the more ultimate reasons behind things. Actualities are not simply built up out of static universals. And unlike Platonic forms, EOs cannot be encountered outside of actual experience (as in a realm of pure reason or contemplation). As such, Whitehead converts Platonic idealism into radical empiricism. EOs are therefore not the ultimate ground of intelligibility or rationality, for reason/intelligibility refer exclusively to actual experience. This is also a consequence of Whitehead’s further – and deceptively simple – definition of eternal objects:

The first principle is that an eternal object…is what it is (SMW, 159) 

According to Stengers, this implies that EOs are singularities that are not primarily defined as “models” or “analogues” for actual entities. In other words: actual entities do not “resemble” the EOs that condition them. If they did, an EO would then be something other than “what it is”, having instead become a model for something other than itself and thus capable of being “characterized on the basis of some of its privileged cases of ingression” (TWW, 211). But even if EOs do remain in some sense transcendent to actuality, Whitehead strips them “of any ‘eminent value’, to which things of this world owe their legitimacy” (TWW, 208).

With this in mind, Steven Shaviro explains the function of EOs as adverbial rather than substantive: they merely express how actual entities relate to one another, rather than dictating what they in fact become. Consequently, EOs are ultimately unknowable and unnamable, as Stengers notes, because “the verbs ‘to know’ and ‘to name’ refer to (sophisticated) modes of feeling, which presuppose the [actual] determination of the ‘how.’” Again: the only reasons are concrete actualities. Stengers continues:

[EOs] are not determinant, but ‘potential for determination.’ They are what determination requires, the definition of the ‘how’ of each feeling, but no particular ‘how’ constitutes a privileged path allowing us to rise back up toward an eternal object…in other words, they explain nothing, justify nothing, guarantee nothing, privilege nothing, especially not intellectual operations in search of abstraction (TWW, 302-303). 

This interpretation of Whitehead is not the only one possible, and it is not without difficulties. It foregrounds some of Whitehead’s convictions to make sense of a very difficult concept in his metaphysics, but one can go about this in another fashion. I have relied primarily on Stengers, Shaviro, and Faber’s readings of Whitehead, but even these careful readers of process philosophy admit to some ambiguous statements in Whitehead’s texts that favor a more idealistic interpretation – which I should note has influenced a great deal of process theology (see Gary Dorrien’s idealistic reading of Whitehead in Kantian Reason and Hegelian Spirit). Ultimately, one’s theological commitments will strongly influence one’s interpretation of Whitehead, whether along idealistic lines or through an empiricist lens.

Having said that, the empiricist reading is intriguing to me, in part because it brings Whitehead closer to Deleuze. In fact, Deleuze implies such a reading of Whitehead in his late work, The Fold, where he relates his concept of the Virtual to EOs. Deleuze opposes the virtual to most concepts of the possible, which tend to function as universal essences that the temporal world actualizes as a sort of pre-formatted blueprint that merely lacks reality. As such, the possible is able to explain reality. But as I have tried to show, EOs are more like the virtual in that they do not lack reality, and they are not universal essences that can be experienced beyond the actual. Thus Stengers notes that, like the virtual, EOs take on differential “modes of ingression” within the actual, so it is impossible for an EO to be “conceived in the image of its actualization” (TWW, 214). On this reading, Whitehead's EOs are less like an eternal model and more like conditioning problems; correspondingly, actualities are creative responses to such problems rather than imitations of models.

In another post, I want to begin to think through the theological implications of this interpretation of EOs. Because Whitehead introduces God as that infinite process that necessarily provides a “place” for eternal objects, one cannot rethink the nature of the possible without also rethinking the nature of divinity.

Works cited:

Roland Faber, The Divine Manifold
Isabelle Stengers, Thinking With Whitehead 
Steven Shaviro, "Eternal Objects" (see also Without Criteria)
Philip Rose, On Whitehead
Gilles Deleuze, The Fold
Gary Dorrien, Kantian Reason and Hegelian Spirit
AN Whitehead, Process and Reality
------------------, Science and the Modern World